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1Securing Aerial-Ground Transmission for 
NOMA-UAV Networks 
 
Abstract—The efficient spectrum utilization of non-orthogonal
multiple access (NOMA) and flexible mobility of unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV) enable NOMA UAV to become a prospective
approach for future wireless networks. However, its secure
transmission remains a great challenge. In this article, we
summarize several potential solutions to mitigate adversarial
eavesdropping towards aerial-ground transmission in NOMA-
UAV networks, and propose three effective security schemes
accordingly. First, a power allocation scheme is proposed at
the UAV to ensure the privacy of a specific user with the sum
transmission rate of others maximized. Closed-form solution is
derived. Then, beamforming is leveraged to provide efficient
privacy protection for multiple users in the network via jointly
optimizing the precoding vectors to avoid eavesdropping and to
maximize the spectrum efficiency. Finally, we perform artificial
jamming together with beamforming to protect all the users
in the network. Numerical results are provided to evaluate the
superiority of the proposed schemes. Some future research issues
and challenges of this direction are also pointed out.
Index Terms—Artificial jamming, beamforming optimization,
non-orthogonal multiple access, power allocation, secure aerial-
ground transmission, unmanned aerial vehicle.
I. INTRODUCTION
Diversity of applications, high mobility and operational flex-
ibility make unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) assisted aerial-
ground transmission one of the most attractive approaches
for future networks [1]. The air-to-ground channels in UAV
networks usually have line-of-sight (LoS), which provides
excellent link quality while also incurring a great danger of
adversarial eavesdropping. Owing to the growing demand for
information privacy, the security of UAV communications has
gained tremendous attention [2]–[7]. Li et al. investigated
the secrecy performance via physical layer for UAV com-
munications in 5G systems [2], when the UAV works as
either a base station (BS) or an aerial user, respectively. The
secrecy performance of an air-to-air network was analyzed in
[3] by Ye et al., where UAVs act as BSs, legitimate users
and eavesdroppers, and the secrecy outage probability (SOP)
and capacity were derived in closed-form. In [4], Hua et al.
jointly optimized the user scheduling and trajectories of two
functional UAVs to maximize the secrecy energy efficiency for
the whole network. Zhang et al. jointly designed the trajectory
of UAV and the transmit power for each legitimate user to
achieve the maximum secrecy rate for the uplink and downlink
transmissions in [5]. In [6], with the aid of UAV jamming, the
lowest secrecy rate for information receivers from the UAV
BS was maximized by Zhou et al. to avoid eavesdropping. In
[7], Cheng et al. proposed a scheme to maximize the lowest
secrecy rate among all the legitimate users via caching, in
which the user scheduling and the flight trajectory of the UAV
relay were jointly optimized.
Furthermore, non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) has
attracted great interest owing to its spectrum efficiency. How-
ever, higher transmit power allocated to farther users in
successive interference cancelation (SIC) leads to a greater
challenge for secure transmission. Recently, some excellent
research related to the secrecy of NOMA has been developed
[8]–[12]. Based on the channel gains, Xiang et al. paired
the primary users and secondary users in [8] to enhance the
security of cognitive NOMA networks. In [9], the security was
guaranteed by Xiao et al. in a massive MIMO based system
through multicast beamforming and null-space SIC of NOMA.
Zhao et al. derived the maximum sum secrecy rate in [10]
through jointly optimizing the precoding vectors to ensure the
secure transmission for downlink NOMA networks. Lv et al.
proposed a secrecy beamforming scheme in [11] to protect
the information privacy in NOMA networks by generating
artificial noise (AN), and the closed-form SOP was devel-
oped. Cao et al. designed a two-stage full-duplex-jamming
relay strategy in [12], to achieve the secure transmission in
cooperative NOMA networks.
Owing to the importance of UAV and NOMA, they have
been both considered in 3GPP standards for 5G networks.
Thus, UAV and NOMA can be combined to achieve the
advantages of both high mobility and efficiency, which will
play an important role for future 6G cellular networks [13].
Although the security of UAV and NOMA has been well
studied separately, few research works have concentrated on
the secrecy of a NOMA-UAV network. In this article, securing
the aerial-ground transmission for NOMA-UAV networks is
studied to prevent secure users from eavesdropping. Firstly,
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Fig. 1. Potential solutions to secure transmission in NOMA-UAV networks.
a power allocation (PA) scheme is proposed to ensure the
secrecy of a specific user for NOMA-UAV networks. Then, to
assure the privacy for some users, beamforming is performed
to manage the received power of different signals at each re-
ceiver. Furthermore, artificial jamming (AJ) is emitted with the
legitimate messages via beamforming to enhance the security
for all the legitimate users in NOMA-UAV networks. Finally,
some open issues and challenges for the future research are
discussed.
The rest of this article is arranged as follows. First, several
potential solutions to the secure transmission in NOMA-UAV
networks are demonstrated in Section II. We propose a PA
scheme to secure the confidential transmission in Section
III. Then, beamforming is performed to optimize the secure
transmission in Section IV. In Section V, an AJ based scheme
is proposed for NOMA-UAV networks. Finally, some open
issues and challenges in the future are pointed in Section VI,
followed by the conclusions in Section VII.
II. SOLUTIONS TO SECURE TRANSMISSION FOR
NOMA-UAV NETWORKS
Owing to the wide access nature of wireless channels
in NOMA-UAV networks, adversarial eavesdropping towards
legitimate users tends to be a great threat. Thus, several
potential solutions to the security of NOMA-UAV networks
are summarized in Fig. 1.
 Power Allocation: In conventional NOMA-UAV net-
works, users with weaker channels are usually assigned a
higher transmit power, which makes weaker users more
vulnerable to eavesdropping. To tackle this, the signal-
to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) threshold for each
NOMA receiver can be adjusted according to their secu-
rity priorities, which can be achieved via PA. Thus, the
message of the secure user can be mixed with the high-
power signals of other users to avoid eavesdropping.
 Beamforming: When the SINR thresholds of legitimate
users are fixed, the secure users cannot only be guaranteed
by PA. This requires beamforming. Through beamform-
ing, we can jointly optimize the precoding vectors to
manage the received power of signals at each receiver.
Thus, the transmit power of secure users can be mini-
mized to tackle the wiretapping.
 Artificial Jamming: When the secure transmission is
required by all the users in NOMA-UAV networks, the
security cannot be guaranteed only by beamforming,
as no legitimate signals can be used for the secure
information to be hidden. Thus, AJ can be generated
together with the designed signals via beamforming to
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Fig. 2. Secure transmission based on PA scheme in NOMA-UAV networks.
combat the wiretapping, without interfering the legitimate
transmission.
In the following sections, we propose three secure transmis-
sion schemes for NOMA-UAV networks based on the above-
mentioned methods.
III. POWER ALLOCATION BASED SECURE TRANSMISSION
IN NOMA-UAV NETWORKS
In conventional NOMA-UAV systems, the farther users with
poorer channels are allocated higher transmit power for SIC,
which results in a great challenge for secure transmission.
Therefore, a PA strategy is proposed in this section to ensure
the secrecy of a specific user in NOMA-UAV networks, while
maximizing the sum rate of other legitimate users.
A. Problem Formulation
A PA scheme is proposed to provide private transmission
for a single secure user via minimizing its allocated transmit
power regardless of its distance from the UAV. This can
hide the secure signal in other common ones to prevent
eavesdropping. Assume thatK+1 single-antenna ground users
are randomly deployed in a NOMA-UAV network while there
exists a passive eavesdropper, as shown in Fig. 2. A fixed-
wing UAV provides wireless connections to one secure user
and several common users with a circular trajectory of radius
rUAV . The altitude and flight cycle of the UAV are H and T ,
resepctively. We assume that the channel coefficient of each
legitimate user from the UAV follows Rician distribution. To
obtain the distances between the UAV and legitimate users,
we divide T by N time slots, and the distance of each
user from the BS is fixed in each time slot. In NOMA-
UAV networks via SIC, PA is usually performed based on
the channel conditions, which poses a great threat on the
secure user, especially when the UAV is located at the farthest
position. To prevent the privacy leakage to both common users
and the eavesdropper, we assign the minimum transmit power
to the secure user regardless its distance from the UAV, which
enables its message to be mixed with the stronger signals of
others to prevent eavesdropping.
To utilize the spectrum more efficiently while guaranteeing
the privacy of the secure user, the sum transmission rate of
common users is maximized through PA while satisfying the
decoding thresholds of both the secure and common users.
We introduce Us and Ui to represent the secure user and
the ith common user, respectively, where i ranges from 1
to K. di indicates the distance from the UAV to Ui, and
ds is the distance from the UAV to Us. Sort the distance of
common users and assume that di is smaller than dj , when
1  i < j  K. Thus, the distances of users can be classified
into three cases, i.e., Us is the farthest user, the nearest user
and the middle user from the UAV. To solve this problem,
the transmit power of the secure user ps should always be
lower than that of the other common users pi. For common
users, with their distance sorted in descending order, their
indices can be redefined according to their distances from
the UAV in each time slot. Then, the PA can be performed
similarly to the conventional NOMA with the transmit power
increasing from UK to U1. Thus, the decoding order can be
described as U1 ! U2 !    ! UK ! Us. Nonetheless,
it is difficult to obtain the solution to the problem owing to
the non-convexity of the sum rate. To tackle this, we first
introduce an auxiliary variable qi, which is the sum transmit
power of U1;    ; Ui and Us, and qi equals to ps when i
equals to s. By replacing pi with qi, the sum rate of common
users in the three cases monotonically increases with qi, while
monotonically decreasing with qs. Therefore, the closed-form
solution of the maximum sum rate for common users can be
obtained while protecting the security for the secure user by
relaxing the bound of pi, which can effectively reduce the
eavesdropping rate to almost 0.
For the fixed decoding threshold of common users, when the
total transmit power of UAV is adequate, we can improve the
transmission rate of the secure user by increasing its decoding
threshold, the upper bound of which can also be derived.
Furthermore, larger decoding threshold of the secure user
makes lower sum rate of common users, which represents the
trade-off between the performance of the secure and common
users.
B. Simulation Results
In order to show the effectiveness of the proposed PA
scheme, simulations are carried out assuming four common
users, one secure user and one eavesdropper. In Fig. 3(a),
the sum rate of the proposed PA scheme in NOMA-UAV
networks is compared with that in the conventional NOMA
during a flight of UAV, and the eavesdropping rate is also
investigated together with the secrecy rate for the proposed
scheme. The total transmit power PS at the UAV is set to
10 mW. The transmission rate threshold of common users is
set to 3:5 bit/s/Hz, while the decoding rate threshold for the
secure user is set to its upper bound. From the results, it is
shown that the sum rate of common users in the proposed
PA scheme and that in the conventional NOMA are similar.
However, the eavesdropping rate in the proposed PA scheme
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Fig. 3. (a) Sum rate, eavesdropping rate and secrecy rate comparison between the proposed PA scheme for NOMA-UAV networks and conventional NOMA
during an entire flight; (b) Relationship between the sum rate of common users and secure decoding threshold in three cases.
towards Us approaches to almost 0 during the entire flight,
and the secrecy rate for Us is close to the decoding threshold.
Thus, the secrecy for the secure user can be guaranteed while
maximizing the sum rate of common users in the proposed
PA scheme. In addition, the impact of the secure decoding
threshold on the sum rate of common users is investigated
in Fig. 3(b), where PS is set to 50 mW, and the decoding
thresholds for common users are set to 3 bit/s/Hz, 3:5 bit/s/Hz
and 4 bit/s/Hz, respectively. The results show that the sum
rate of common users linearly decreases with the decoding
threshold of secure user until it approaches the threshold of
common users or PS becomes insufficient. Thus, a tradeoff
should be made between the secrecy rate of the secure user
and the sum rate of common users.
IV. SECURITY ENHANCEMENT VIA BEAMFORMING IN
NOMA-UAV NETWORKS
PA can ensure the secure transmission for one specific user
in NOMA-UAV networks. However, it becomes inefficient
when several users require secure transmission. Thus, we
exploit beamforming to accomplish the security of multiple
users with the sum rate of others maximized for NOMA-UAV
networks in this section [14].
A. Beamforming Optimization for Secure Users
To guarantee the privacy of several secure users in NOMA-
UAV networks simultaneously, beamforming can be utilized to
disrupt the eavesdropping via joint beamforming optimization
at the UAV. Specifically, the received power from the secure
users can be minimized at all legitimate receivers through
joint beamforming optimization. In this case, the private
information can be hidden to prevent eavesdropping.
Consider a NOMA-UAV network with S secure users and
K   S common users randomly distributed on the ground. di
represents the distance from the UAV to user i. We assume that
di is smaller than dj for the secure users, when 1  i  j  S,
and dm is smaller than dn for the common users when
S + 1  m  n  K. However, the distance from the
UAV to some secure users may be larger than those from the
UAV to the common users, which will cause the security issue
when the conventional PA of NOMA is applied. To ensure
the transmission security of these users, multiple antennas at
the UAV can be leveraged to minimize the received power of
the secure users at each legitimate receiver via optimizing the
beamforming vectors, and the sum rate of the other common
users can be maximized with the decoding threshold. Thus, the
transmit power of the private signals for the secure users can be
minimized by hiding in the stronger signals of common users,
which increases the difficulty in adversarial eavesdropping
significantly.
The problem is difficult to solve due to its non-convexity.
We first introduce an auxiliary variable to simplify the deriva-
tion, through which the logarithmic sum equation related
to the coupled SINRs can be converted to the exponential
product function to transform the objective function of the
problem to be convex. Moreover, by utilizing the first-order
Taylor approximation, the power constraints and the decoding
threshold can also be converted to convex expressions. Thus,
through transforming the optimization into a second-order
cone programming (SOCP) problem, it can be solved by CVX
iteratively.
B. Simulation Results
The secrecy performance of the proposed beamforming
scheme for NOMA-UAV networks is shown in Fig. 4, in which
there are three secure users and two common users. We set the
decoding threshold r to 0.5 bit/s/Hz. The distance of the users
from the UAV follows d1  d4  d2  d5  d3. Firstly, the
secrecy rate Rsec of the three secure users is compared for the
proposed beamforming scheme and the conventional NOMA
in Fig. 4(a). From the results, we can see that the proposed
scheme has high Rsec for all the secure users owing to its
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Fig. 4. (a) Secrecy rate comparison of the proposed beamforming scheme and conventional NOMA; (b) Secrecy rate and eavesdropping rate comparison of
the proposed scheme with different number of antennas.
decoding order U5 ! U4 ! U3 ! U2 ! U1. However, in
conventional NOMA, the Rsec of U2 and U3 is much lower
due to its decoding order U3 ! U5 ! U2 ! U4 ! U1.
In addition, the sum transmit power Psum of UAV will also
result in higher Rsec. Then, the effect of the number of
antennas at the UAV on the eavesdropping rate Re and the
Rsec of the three secure users is examined in Fig. 4(b). From
the examination, we can observe that the Rsec of each user
increases with the number of antennas, while the Re decreases
with it. Therefore, more antennas will result in better secrecy
performance of the proposed beamforming scheme.
V. SECURE ARTIFICIAL JAMMING FOR NOMA-UAV
NETWORKS
When all the legitimate users in the network require secure
transmission, their security cannot be guaranteed only by
using beamforming in Section IV, as there always exist some
users with higher transmit power. Thus, in this section, AJ is
exploited together with beamforming to guarantee the security
for all the legitimate users in NOMA-UAV networks [15].
In addition, the transmit power for jamming is usually high
enough to effectively disrupt the eavesdropping. Thus, simulta-
neous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) is also
considered to offset the energy consumption from jamming.
A. Two-Phase SWIPT Scheme for NOMA-UAV Networks
We consider a multi-antenna UAV providing secure SWIPT
for K ground receivers via NOMA in Fig. 5. The receivers are
passive and will not wake up until enough energy is collected.
Thus, a two-phase SWIPT scheme for NOMA-UAV networks
is proposed within each time frame T , i.e., the first phase T
for energy harvesting (EH) and the second phase T   T for
both information decoding (ID) and EH, where  is between 0
and 1. In the second phase, the collected power P [i]r for the ith
user is divided into two parts, iP
[i]
r for EH, and the rest (1 
i)P
[i]
r for ID, where i 2 (0; 1) denotes the power splitting
Artificial Jamming
Eavesdropper
Passive User
P
Phase 1
EH
ID
Jam
Phase 2
t
Fig. 5. AJ-based secure transmission scheme with SWIPT in NOMA-UAV
networks.
ratio for the ith user. AJ is also adopted in the second phase
to combat the adversarial wiretapping towards the legitimate
SWIPT in the network. To maximize the throughput of the
network, provide enough energy for the passive users, and
guarantee their security,  , i, the precoding vector vi for
user i and vjam for jamming should be jointly optimized,
i = 1;    ;K.
During the first phase of EH, the ground users collect
energy from the signal transmitted by the UAV to wake up.
To guarantee fast charging, the received power at each user
should be maximized with the transmit power constraint PS
of the UAV. The optimal precoding vector w can be derived
to maximize the lowest received power at each legitimate
receiver. Thus, all the users can be waken up rapidly when
the required energy is harvested.
After the energy is collected in the first phase, secure
SWIPT can be performed in the second one. To achieve secure
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Fig. 6. (a) Secrecy rate, eavesdropping rate comparison of three users for different thresholds of jamming rate; (b) Time ratio and throughput comparison
of the proposed scheme for NOMA-UAV networks.
transmission for all the legitimate users, three constraints
should be followed. First, the received power of power at
each user should be higher than that of the legitimate signals,
which can disrupt the eavesdropping efficiently. The jamming
signal can be decoded first at all the legitimate receivers due
to its highest transmit power. Then, the remaining power is
allocated to legitimate users following NOMA. Finally, the
energy collected in the two phases should be sufficient to
support the circuit consumption and the ID. To maximize the
network throughput and guarantee the secure transmission,
 , vi, vjam and i are jointly optimized with the above-
mentioned constraints, i = 1;    ;K. To effectively derive
the solution to the proposed problem, we first transform the
non-convexities into convex ones. The logarithmic coupled
objective function can be turned to a concave one via the
exponential product approximation. The constraints can also
be reformulated to convex ones by the combination of first
order Taylor approximation and the hyperbolic constraint
transformation. After these transformations, the original op-
timization problems can be casted as another convex SOCP
problem, which can be solved via CVX iteratively.
B. Numerical Results
In the simulation, the security and throughput for the
proposed AJ scheme with SWIPT are demonstrated in Fig.
6 with different transmit power PS . The rate threshold for the
three users is set to 1 bit/s/Hz, with their distance from the
UAV following d1  d2  d3. In Fig. 6(a), the wiretapping
rate Re and the secrecy rate Rsec of these three users are
analyzed. From the results, we can see that the farthest user
U3 has the lowest Rsec and highest Re. Furthermore, we can
also conclude that the eavesdropping rate towards U3 becomes
lower with larger jamming threshold rjam. The impact of PS
on  and the network throughput is analyzed in Fig. 6(b). It is
shown that,  for the three users all decreases with PS , which
results in a significant increase of the throughput.
VI. OPEN RESEARCH ISSUES AND CHALLENGES
Despite of previous effort, there still exist some research
issues and future challenges on securing the aerial-ground
transmission for NOMA-UAV networks.
Channel Models: In this article, the secure transmission of
NOMA-UAV networks is based on LoS channels with Rician
fading. However, the practical air-to-ground channels are more
complex, which are LoS Rician fading or Non-LoS (NLoS)
Rayleigh fading with different probabilities according to the
environment, height and angle. Thus, the influence of UAV
channels on the security performance of NOMA-UAV should
be further investigated.
Secrecy Outage Probability: In this article, the secrecy trans-
mission rate is adopted as a metric for NOMA-UAV networks.
However, the SOP is another important metric to measure the
secrecy performance, which becomes even more complex for
NOMA-UAV networks due to the different probabilities of
LoS and NLoS.
Imperfect SIC: In most research on NOMA-UAV, SIC per-
formed at receivers is considered to be perfect. Nevertheless, it
is imperfect in practical systems due to the complex procedure
of interference cancellation, especially for the strong users last
decoded. Thus, how to mitigate the effect caused by imperfect
SIC is a great challenge.
SIC Eavesdropping: Eavesdroppers usually cannot distin-
guish multi-user legitimate data through SIC, which is a
reasonable assumption due to the high requirements and
information exchange to achieve SIC. However, when the
eavesdropper has the strong capability to cancel the legitimate
signals successively, it becomes a great threat for NOMA-UAV
networks.
Methods for Security: We have considered three methods
of power allocation, beamforming and artificial jamming to
provide secure communication for NOMA-UAV networks. On
the other hand, there also exist some other potential candidates
to enhance the security for NOMA-UAV, such as cooperative
jamming, relay selection, polarization, etc., which should be
studied in the future.
Jamming Attack: Adversarial jamming is another security
aspect, which can greatly disrupt the normal transmission
7for NOMA-UAV networks. However, this important issue of
jamming attack is largely omitted in the existing research on
the security of NOMA-UAV networks. It should be studied in
the future.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Transmission security has become a challenging issue in
the development of NOMA-UAV networks. In this article,
three potential solutions to the secure transmission are pre-
sented for NOMA-UAV networks to avoid the eavesdropping.
First, a PA scheme is proposed to provide security protection
when only one user requires secure transmission in NOMA-
UAV networks. Then, the precoding vectors for the UAV are
jointly designed to extend the secure transmission for several
users via beamforming. In addition, AJ is adopted together
with beamforming at the UAV to achieve secure SWIPT for
all the NOMA users, where the beamforming vectors and
scheduling are jointly designed to improve the throughput with
the security guaranteed. Finally, some future research issues
and challenges on securing the aerial-ground transmission in
NOMA-UAV networks have been pointed out.
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